The Jewish Question in Recent Political Thinking

In each society there are citizens holding extreme right-wing or extreme left-wing views. However, from the point of view of the political system, it is no matter of indifference at all what their proportion is, the extent to which they represent danger to social peace, the degree of emotional intensity with which they turn towards the minority groups treated by them to be the cause of the bad emotional state of society. Jewry has traditionally been a group victimized by right-wing extremism. Immigrants in Western Europe, while the Roma in our region have become the typical target of hatred of recent radical nationalist trends. According to Tamás Stark's calculations published in 2002[1], the number of Jewry in 1990 was minimum about 74,000 and maximum 135,000. According to present-day estimates, the number of those whose at least one parent was Jewish is between 80,000 and 150,000.[2] However, the world of facts and the world of political thinking about facts are light years away. One of the characteristics of how ideologies work is that they select from the phenomena of reality, overstating certain things while leaving others obscure. Seeing phenomena against the background of distorting ideologies results in peculiar proportions. That is how Hungarian Jewry, which is a handful compared to the Hungarian population, can become for Hungarian anti-Semitism "worthy of its theme" the terrifying enemy threatening the existence of Hungarians. It is the task of the followers of extreme ideology to "uncover and bring them under control".

The Jewish question stands out among minority group conflicts in Hungary (as well). It bears more significant political relevance than the cause of minorities with otherwise bigger populations. The search results generated by search engines of political yearbooks on the working of the Hungarian political system between 1988 and 2008[3] for the word Jewish and its inflected forms as well as compounds were 489 while for the word anti-Semite and its

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[1] Statistics taking into account the whole archives about the population of Hungarian Jewry after the Holocaust have not been prepared. According to the most accepteed estimates in specialist literature, out of them, about 300,000 living in post-Trianon Hungary and 569,500 within the 1944 borders of Hungary were killed. In 1946, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office estimated the number of survivors to be 220-260,000. Stark, Tamás. "Kísérlet a zsidó népesség számának behatárolására 1945 és 2000 között." In. Kovács, András, ed. *Zsidók a mai Magyarországon.* Budapest: Múlt és Jövő, 2002. 119.

[2] The number of Jewry varies depending on wether it is based on descent or religion. Kovács, András, and Forrás-Bíró Aletta. "Zsidó élet Magyarországon: Eredmények kihívások és célok a kommunista rendszer bukása óta." ["Jewish Life in Hungary. Results, Challenges and Goals since the Fall of the Communist Regime."] Research report. Jewish Policy Research. http://www.rothschildfoundation.eu/downloads/hungarian_language_report.pdf 7.o 90% of Hungarian Jews live in the capital city. Approximately 5% of the inhabitants of Budapest can be considered Jewish.

[3] Sándor, Péter, and Vass László. eds. *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1998-2008*. [*Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2008*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2009. Digital document.

inflected forms as well as compounds 267 results were given. According to the minutes of the Hungarian Almanac[4], the word anti-Semitism has been mentioned in legislation 117 times in 20 years while the extreme right was mentioned 255 times by the speakers. It is worth making a similar comparison with the results given in connection with other Hungarian minorities. In the same period, the *German minority* in Hungary, whose population can be estimated to be 200-220,000, was mentioned 3 times, another 7 results were given for the term *Swabian*, while *Germans in Hungary* were mentioned 19 times. Similar results are given in the case of the Slovaks, whose number is around 100-110,000. Altogether 2 results were given for the word *Slovak* by political yearbooks while 19 results by parliamentary minutes. The frequency of different mentioning of the Jews is only outnumbered by the key words of the Roma themes. In 20 years, 697 results were given for the word *Roma* and its inflected forms as well as compounds while the hit ratio of the word *Gipsy* and its collocations was 752. The results concerning both the Jews and the Roma vary from year to year. However, the data of year 2007 spectacularly stand out in respect of both minorities. This can presumably be in connection with the great number of reactions triggered off by the appearance of the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) and Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) gaining strength. Nevertheless, we can find a difference in the order of magnitude concerning the amount of mention of the Jews and the Roma in 2007, which might be explained by the increasing number of anti-Roma statements in internal politics. In the Political Yearbook of Hungary representing 2007, the word Jewish and its collocations appear 62 times while in the case of the Roma, the figure is more than six times higher, exactly 450.

The studied 20 volumes of the political yearbooks of Hungary representing public life between 1988 and 2008 do not only comprise scientific studies, but also contain the chronicles of the years in question, the political essays/publications having caused the greatest stir as well as the most important political documents. Although based on the quantitative data gained from them, we cannot draw correct conclusions regarding the situation of Hungarian Jewry, that of anti-Semitic prejudices and the extent of anti-Semitism, we may still state that the data indicate the heightened interest of public life in the theme. We may also state that the Jewish question – though its intensity varied with different periods – but has continuously been present in Hungarian political thinking. However, compared to the Roma issue, it is clear that not the Jewish question creates the greatest stir among the minority problems in Hungary.

[4] "Országgyűlési Napló 1998-2008." ["Parliamentary Almanac 1998-2008."] In. Sándor, Péter, and Vass László. eds. *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1998-2008.* [*Political Yearbook of Hungary on 1998-2008*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2009. Digital document.

When in 2006-2007 the extreme right came into sight in Hungary again, analysts and public figures much more frequently related the dangers stemming from this new situation with the Roma issue than the Jewish question.

Researchers in anti-Semitism essentially take three directions when studying the anti-Semitic phenomena manifested in modern societies. At the level of personal prejudice, in respect of social discourse and the role it plays in political struggles. In what follows, considering all the three points of view at the same time, we are looking for an answer to the question how anti-Semitic views changed in Hungarian political thinking after the change of regime and what factors make it difficult to judge the extent of Hungarian anti-Semitism realistically.

One cannot consider the development of personal prejudice to be exclusively the result of childhood socialization. The development of prejudiced thinking is formed by the complex entirety of socio-psychological situations. Generally social background indicators such as dissatisfaction with life, the extent of social-political frustration, the degree of feeling defenceless, the existence or lack of trust in social institutions and the members of society and the feeling of anomie may influence it. Under certain conditions, primarily minority groups might become the target of growing discriminatory attitude and it may seem for many as if their existence were the main cause of the problems of the majority society. The indicator formed to measure the social causes reinforcing anti-minority attitudes, the so-called DEREX Index (Demand for Right-Wing Extremism Index) based on the database of the European Social Survey, is supposed to show the susceptibility of society to extreme right-wing views. The index is based on 29 answers given to questions examining psychological and political attitudes, which apart from socio-psychological factors also show the self-placement on the political left-right scale as well as the degree of anti-establishment sentiments.[5] Besides the DEREX Index focusing on the image of society, several other theories have been produced to explain anti-Semitism appearing at a personal level, on which presenting an overview cannot be our task here. However, it is worth highlighting the concept of the so-called new authoritarianism, according to which the authoritarian personality with a closed mindset is more likely to discriminate against minorities. The classic theory of the authoritarian personality described by Adorno and his colleagues (the old authoritarianism concept) right

[5] Cf. Krekó, Péter, Juhász Attila, and Molnár Csaba. "A szélsőjobboldal iránti társadalmi kereslet növekedése Magarországon." ["Rising Social Demand for the Extreme Right in Hungary."] *Politikatudományi Szemle*. 2 (2011): 53-63. We will come back to the DEREX scores of Hungary later.

after World War II needed to be modified due to the social changes having taken place in the second half of the 20th century. The family and the state as the classic reference points of authoritarian identification had weakened while the feelings of ontological insecurity of the self had increased significantly in European societies at the turn of the millennium. This resulted in the birth of the modern version of authoritarianism. While the earlier authoritarian personality chose the family and the state to relieve the tension stemming from facing torturing insecurity, nowadays they believe to find protection in the community of the nation perceived as a tribe standing against the state.[6]

Apart from the personal level, anti-Semitism can be grasped in the dimension of public discourse as well. The social effect of anti-Semitic public discourse can be greatly influenced by the social status of their disseminators as well as the fact that how legitimate they are in the eyes of the potential recipients. In the case of authoritative public figures and media, anti-minority public discourse might have normative power. Nevertheless, if the figures of mainstream public communication classify the anti-Semitic world view and programme illegitimate, its representatives may become isolated. Thus, the fact in itself that anti-Semitic voices have become louder does not automatically lead to the strengthening of anti-Semitic sentiment.[7] Finally, anti-Semitism may also become a more or less coherent political ideology, an organizing principle, if political actors consciously building on latent anti-Semitic attitudes in society[8], use it as a tactical weapon to gain mass support. The success of such policy depends on society's willingness to accept it after all. Existing personal prejudice – while finding its justification in political anti-Semitism – makes its bearer apt to be mobilized for political purposes. As a result, in the political market, we can talk about *"supply"* and *"demand"*, whose meeting is mutually – though as we saw it, in a different way – beneficial for the parties of both sides. At this level, the development of anti-Semitism is in close connection with the fact that to what extent relevant political figures, from their value commitment's point of view, consider it legitimate, that is, an allowable political tool to play the *"anti-Semite trump card"*. Although such a political tool is available in party political

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[6] For an overview of the theories Cf. Csepeli, György, Murányi István, and Prazsák Gergő. *Új tekintélyelvűség a mai Magyarországon. Társadalmi csoportok hierarchiájának látásviszonyai*. [*New Authoritarianism in Contemporary Hungarian Society*.] Budapest: Aperion Kiadó, 2011. 9-24.

[7] Gimes, Gergely, Juhász Attila, Kiss Kálmán, Krekó Péter, and Somogyi Zoltán. "Kutatási Összefoglaló az előítélet, intolerancia hazai helyzetéről." ["A research summary report on the situation of prejudices and intolerance in Hungary."] *Látlelet 2008*. Commissioned by the Hungarian Anti-Racism Foundation (Magyar Antirasszista Alapítvány), 22. Retrieved. 4 Nov. 2011. from: http://www.maraalapitvany.hu/upload/eloiteletesseg_tanulmany_081016.pdf

[8] Kovács, András. "Antiszemita előítéletek a mai Magyarországon. A disszertáció tézisei." ["Anti-Semitic Prejudices in Contemporary Hungary. The main points of the thesis."] http://www.mtaki.hu/docs/all_in_one/061020_kovacs_andras_tezisek.pdf5-6.o.

struggles in theory, one does not necessarily have to make use of that. The political instrumentalization of anti-Semitism may take place in two directions. The social demand for right-wing extremism might create a kind of extreme political supply in the political market. However, public thinking is less aware of the fact that the statement is true the other way round as well. Not only the Jewish question but anti-Semitism can be overplayed as well. The ideological image of anti- Semitism having been pumped up artificially to become terrifying, threatening people with the immediate danger of fascism can also be taken as the proof for a country's democratic deficit. The charge of anti-Semitism as a political trump card is a tool to stigmatize the political adversary. *"Alleged anti-Semitism"* serving the purpose of party politics, similarly to the ideology of anti-Semitism, is formed by arbitrarily selecting among social phenomena and simplifying complex reality. It is easy to realize that both ideological approaches, playing the *"anti-Semite trump"* and the *"fascist card"*, can be equally dangerous not only for the given minority but for the inner peace of the country as well.

On the extent of anti-Semitism in Hungary and evaluating its manifestations, opinions among Hungarians and within the Jewish community as well as the researchers of the theme are divided[9]. The joint effects of several factors make it difficult to judge the phenomenon realistically. Because of the political instrumentalization of modern anti-Semitism, political figures tend to overuse such rather unclarified notions as nationalist, anti-Semite, fascist or extreme right wing. Under the circumstances of political struggles of parties, it is often not even in the interest of political figures to clarify the semantic content of the notions. As a result, there is no consensus on where the boundary is set between a negative value judgement on Jews and anti-Semitism. The impact of intellectual debates using loose notions have on the formation of the world view of those interested in politics is enhanced by mediatized political publicity. This influence can be especially strong in political systems where the media acting as the intermediary of political communication lose their impartiality and from being the mediator of politics, become its servant[10]. The tradition of unbiased journalism in Hungary

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[9] The results of a focus group survey carried out among the Jews have shown that making anti-Semitism serve the purpose of party politics has aroused criticism within the community too. "Many have criticized the MAZSIHISZ (Federation for Jewish Communities) for not being active enough in the question of anti-Semitism and often only making statements about anti-Semitic phenomena if it believes to render a service to such political powers from which it expects support – that is the political left. On the contrary, Chabad was criticized for trying to play down anti-Semitic phenomena for political purposes too." Kovács, András, and Forrás-Bíró, Aletta. "Zsidó élet Magyarországon: Eredmények, kihívások és célok a kommunista rendszer bukása óta." Research report. Institute for Jewish Policy Research http://www.rothschildfoundation.eu/downloads/hungarian_language_report.pdf 7.o. 42-43.

[10] Varga, Domokos György. *Sok, kevés, elég- Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2005.-ről.* [A lot, Little, Enough – Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2005.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2006. Digital document

was weaker from the start, that is why it almost seems natural if the extent of anti-Semitic or extreme-right danger is intended to be played down by certain right-wing media organs while exaggerated by left-wing papers.

Hidden anti-Semitism that can be experienced at the level of personal prejudices, the so-called latent anti-Semitism, can give rise to further debate on the extent of anti-Semitism in society. Latent anti-Semites – contrary to extreme anti-Semites – are aware of the fact that their views are not considered to be legitimate in democratic societies by the majority. That is why they avoid social punishment of norm breakers by not expressing their views publicly, not responding to the questions concerning the Jews in empirical research or concealing their inner conviction behind the behavioural patterns believed to be socially acceptable. As a result of the spiral of silence, anti-Semitism cannot be measured with empirical research tools with absolute certainty. There is no scientific consensus on the accuracy of indicators developed to measure latent anti-Semitism, that is, it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that the refusal to respond to questions during the research is, in reality, the sign of latent anti-Semitism and not the sign of lack of attitudes. A further difficulty is that about the extent of anti-Semitism in Hungary some researchers draw a conclusion based solely on the existence or lack of anti-Semitic prejudices in the country. It is a more sophisticated method when not only what people think of the Jews is examined but also the emotional saturation of prejudices and finally the extent to which all these influence political action in reality[11]. When judging the extent and social danger of Hungarian anti-Semitism, it is not indifferent that one reckons with only extreme anti-Semites, what is one's estimated rate of latent anti-Semitism and in addition, when judging the danger, whether one takes into account the potential effect that emotional intensity in connection with Jews has on social action. Nevertheless, it is not unprecedented either that the researchers themselves get tangled in the political field outlined above and draw tendentious conclusions based on the data and sources available to them. The scientific approaches which uniformly and without distinction present all the figures of Hungarian anti-Semitic political thinking as forerunners of fascism serve as a good example of this phenomenon. Ottokár Prohászka, Bishop of Székesfehérvár's views about the Jews are

[11] For the methodological solutions to measuring latent anti-Semitism Cf. e.g. András Kovács's research report. Kovács, András. "Látent antiszemitizmus." ["Latent Anti-Semitism."] http://www.mtapti.hu/mszt/19994/kovacs.htm, Furthermore, the propositions of the author's thesis. "Antiszemita előítéletek Magyarországon." ["Anti-Semitic Prejudices in Hungary."] http://www.mtaki.hu/docs/all_in_one/061020_kovacs_andras_tezisek.pdf

equalized with Ferenc Szálasi[12]. Not only when judging anti-Semitism of the past but also that of the period after the regime change – the latter being more relevant to our theme – can we meet sharply different opinions held by researchers about how to evaluate the situation. Miklós Szabó affiliated with Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ,AFD) (has deceased since then) talked about *"the threatening Renaissance of anti-Semitism"* in the 1990s while according to Tibor Erényi's opinion in 1996 (a Holocaust survivor), the extent of anti-Semitism was not larger than generally in Western Europe and *"it was a pity to use it for arousing hysteria"* [13] both at home and abroad. These days in political science, there is a professional discourse suggesting political overtones about the evaluation of the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) phenomenon. The essence of the debate is whether the party's self-definition as *"radical nationalist"* is acceptable from a scientific point of view or it simply has to be considered as an extreme right-wing fascist party. According to some researchers' evaluation of the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s election results in 2009 and 2010, they indicated *"the extraordinary strengthening of the Hungarian extreme right to such an extent that had not been experienced since 1939"*. In their opinion, the acceptance of the radical nationalist definition would strengthen the position of the party from the outset and for this very reason they consider it harmful. Supporters of this viewpoint argue that although making a distinction between anti-establishment extremism and radicalism, which in theory conforms to the establishment, is legally justifiable, but in political practice this dividing line cannot be drawn precisely[14]. According to other authors, rather sympathizing with the right wing, Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) – although is on the right edge of the political spectrum – cannot be considered fascist. *"Not fascist, not National Socialist, but nationalist, socialist – the other extreme, the radical left reads the two words together"* [15]– write the authors referring to the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, HSP) under the term radical left. *Nemzet és Radikalizmus* [Nation and Radicalism] published by Századvég Kiadó in 2011 regards Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) as a member of a

[12] András Kovács criticized the 1992 volume titled *Kirekesztők* by László Karsai, as follows: "The mistake made by the book was that from the Arrow Cross men to Csoóri and Csurka it homogenized anti-Semitic literature, not making any difference between anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, fascist and merely prejudiced texts. With this step, research into the past has entered the service of politics again." Kovács, András. "A demokrácia vadhajtásai." http://www.antiszemitizmus.hu/a+demokracia+vadhajtasai+i+3.html

[13] Erényi, Tibor. *A zsidók története Magyarországon*. [*The History of the Jews in Hungary.*] Útmutató, 1996. 124. cited by Róbert, Szabó. *A kommunizmus és a zsidóság az 1945 utáni Magyarországon*. [*Communism and Jewry in Post-1945 Hungary*.] 350.

[14] Krekó, Péter, Juhász Attila, and Molnár Csaba. "A szélsőjobboldal iránti társadalmi kereslet növekedése Magyarországon." ["Rising Social demand for the Extrreme Right in Hungary."] *Politikatudományi Szemle*. 2. (2011) 55.

[15] G. Fodor, Gábor, Fűrész Gábor, and Giró-Szász András. "Kocsmapolitika." ["Saloon-bar Politics."] Századvég, Retrieved. 2010. from: http://www.szazadveg.hu/files/kutatas/2.pdf 6.

new European party family and distinguishes its political thinking from both fascism in the traditional sense and the notion of right-wing extremism considered to be anti-establishment.[16] The lack of consensus on the definition of Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) shown above is only seemingly independent of the Hungarian debates on anti-Semitism since nobody has questioned the existing anti-Semitic elements in the ideology of the rising party. However, not this was at stake during the professional discourse which was in its prime between 2007 and 2010, but all the more so that to what extent can centre-right Fidesz following the *"one camp, one flag"* strategy be shifted right and the dividing line between Fidesz and anti-Semitic Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) be blurred at the level of professional discourse. What is more, Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) can be declared as an extremist party which is even fraught with as much social danger as the Arrow Cross movement.

The legacy

Since its formation in the last third of the nineteenth century, political anti-Semitism had been closely connected to the issues of the political regime in which it occurred. Public discourse on the Jews appeared to be primarily the question of emancipation, their legal equalization, in the Reform Age while it was much rather a question of assimilation in the era of Dualism. In the latter period, anti-Semitism meant that its representatives to a greater or lesser degree but still questioned the honesty of the group's assimilation after all. At the turn of the 19-20th centuries, the Hungarian Jewish question was closely connected to the so-called cultural criticism trend developing in the period. This interpreted the new modernization phenomena of Hungarian society as the *"Jewishization"* of culture after all. Since then the questions of modernization and opinions on the position of Jews in Hungarian society were closely linked together. The period of the Hungarian Council's Republic substantiated the possibility of linking leftist power to Jewish power in anti-Semitic discourse. In Hungary between the two World Wars, - besides the earlier established and fixed patterns of anti-Semitic world view as well as the adapted Nazi anti-Semitism treated as the *"spirit of the age"* – a new element, which was going to play a role later too, was that the Jewish question became the

[16] Cf. Lánczi, András. ed. *Nemzet és radikalizmus*. [*Nation and Radicalism*.] Századvég, 2011.

representational tool of the conflict of Hungarian intellectual groups in the populist-urbanist debate started from the 1930s.[17]

After 1945, several laws condemned the events of the Holocaust by which the regime made its relationship to the past unambiguous. However, in human heads individual and collective examination of conscience did not take place.[18] In the Coalition Period, it was possible to have a public discourse on what had happened, but instead of a real dialogue, the issue much rather tended to have sunk to the level of becoming the tactical weapon in the struggles of political parties. It was in the interest of the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Párt, MKP) to remove members of Christian middle-class from power organs and that is why it supported the employment of Jewish intellectuals with a spotless political past, who trusting the anti-fascist left wing took advantage of the opportunity. However, it caused dissatisfaction in society that the Jews who had survived the Holocaust joined the Communist Party (MKP), which represented the occupiers, in large numbers, undertook different positions in the apparatus of the state and last but not least in law enforcement agencies. Some members of the public tended to consider it to be the proof that Jews and communist power were intertwined, reviving the 1919 *"Judeo-Bolshevik"* pattern, that is, communist power equals Jewish power. Not even the fact that the measures (nationalization, the war against the bourgeois survival)[19] taken after 1948 by the communists who seized power, hit hardest on the Jews, who had developed a bourgeois mentality most, had not shaken this inveterate belief. Those who think in the Jewish-Hungarian dichotomy failed to notice that the terror of the Rákosi regime followed an entirely different logic, the logic of class struggle, that is why, for example, that in the course of the 1951 internal exiles directed against *"the former ruling classes"*, there were Jews equally among those who sent others into internal exile and those who were sent into internal exile.[20] Between 1953 and 1956,

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[17] For the up to now most detailed presentation spanning over eras of the role played by the Jewish question in Hungarian political thinking . Cf. Gyurgyák, János. *A zsidókérdés Magyarországon*. [*The Jewish Question in Hungaiy*.] Osiris Kiadó, 2006.

[18] Cf. Győri Szabó, Róbert. A *kommunizmus és a zsidóság az 1945 utáni Magyarországon*. [*Communism and Jewry in Post-1945 Hungary*.] Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 2009. 57-349. The work is the summary of the history of the Jewish question between 1945-1990. It also set forth debates in specialist literature.

[19] According to Viktor Karády's calculations, 88% of 1721 retail shops nationalized in 1949, 75% of the blocks of flats nationalized in1952 were owned by Jewish people, 64% of 687 lawyers removed from office were Jewish. Karádi, Viktor. "Szociológiai kísérlet a magyarországi zsidóság 1945-56 közötti helyzetének elemzésére." In. *Zsidóság az 1945 utáni Magyarországon*. Párizs: 1984. 146-147.

[20] At the beginning, when constructing show trials, it was not a criterion whether somebody was Jewish or not. Later, however, - for tactical reasons, mainly to exploit anti-Semitism existing in political culture – the Jewish descent of those against whom legal action was taken became an issue. The leaders of the State Security Authority (ÁVH) arrested at the beginning of 1953, high-ranking police officers, "Zionist" doctors and leaders of the Jewish denomination were nearly 100.

Jewish people were present among the revolutionaries turning against the regime and the victims of the retaliation as well as in the base of the new power alike. According to numerous researchers, the Kádár regime in its early period equally punished and oriented itself towards the populist and urbanist intellectual camps. At the same time, the system made nationalism and the Jewish question taboo as well as punished nationalist and anti-Semitic manifestations. It is impossible to establish the extent of latent anti-Semitism remaining in society under artificial suppression. However, it can be rendered likely that by the 1980s, in the image of society held by the majority of Hungarians, the criterion of ethnicity did not play any role whatsoever. By that time, the majority of people did not keep in mind the descent of party functionaries or state leaders. The Hungarian Jewish question might have seemed to have ceased to function as a political organizing power. Although not as the result of honestly coming to terms with what had happened, but much rather due to the deliberate suppression policy of the party.

However, political publicity born as a result of the system change created a new situation from multiple points of view. Hungarian society had to learn that one cannot only exercise one's right of freedom of speech but can also abuse it. Besides the appearance of loud vulgar anti-Semites denying the Holocaust, in Hungarian political thinking, the more moderate nationalist trends' numerous traditions concerning the Jews came to light. The political socialization legacy of socialism did not play a determining role immediately. The anti-Semitic pattern born in 1919 and became fixed in the Rákosi era, that is, "communist power equals Jewish power", and connecting the left wing with Jewry, turned up only later as a result of the rapprochements between the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, HSP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ, AFD), when the radical right, schematizing its timely post-1994 political enemies, created its stereotype of the *"Judeo-Bolshevik"*. However, the tradition which came to light first in intellectual debates was the populist-urbanist divide, which traditionally had had a specific reading of the Jewish question since the 30s of the 20th century. The reason for its early renaissance was – with the help of some ideological simplification – that it was possible to be connected to the political stratification of the regime-changing opposition and the relationship changes between the so-called democratic (urbanist) and populist-nationalist groups.

Anti-Semitism has been present in post-system-change Hungarian society from the outset, but the period so far cannot be regarded as homogeneous at all.[21] That is why in what follows, we

[21] Csőke, Zoltán. "A határvonalak meghúzásának fontossága." *Szombat*. http://www.szombat.org/ftp/a_hatarvonalak_meghuzasanak_fontossaga_2.pdf 2005.

will discuss the role played by the Jewish question and anti-Semitism in Hungarian political thinking divided into three periods, focusing on characteristics typical of each. The question of anti-Semitism is shown as a primarily intellectual discourse between 1989 and 2002 and a tool of the political struggles of parties between 2002 and 2010. Finally, we deal with the phenomenon of new authoritarianism represented by Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), on the rise since 2007. We examine whether as a result of radical nationalism and the economic crisis, the number of anti-Semites in Hungary has risen or not in the latest period.

Who started it and who continued it?

The thematization of the Jewish question after the regime change was fed from multiple sources at the same time. Neo-Nazi literature could flow into the country more freely and as taboos became less strict, overt anti-Semitism was voiced soon. Ferenc Kunszabó's *Hunnia Füzetek*, László Romhányi's weekly *Szent Korona* or Áron Mónus's publications revived traditional anti-Semitic patterns. Initially, Albert Szabó's Világnemzeti (és) Népuralmi Párt (World-National People's Power Party) appearing in 1993 and other smaller neo-Nazi groups caused a great stir, but soon it turned out that they were good at nothing other than arousing hatred and were unable to adapt Arrow Cross ideology to modern circumstances. This kind of extreme and overt anti-Semitic speech – whose authenticity was not supported by any concrete social experience whatsoever and what is more the anti-Semites representing it also had a low social prestige – was made illegitimate, in a short time, its representatives became isolated and lost their authenticity.

The series of discourse held by the intellectual elite of the capital had a greater impact. Although within bounds, but the latent pluralism of the 80s made it possible for the representatives of intellectual life to recreate the hidden philo-Semitic and anti-Semitic attitudes representing the differences between the populist and urbanist approaches and later, by the second half of the era, the groups themselves. The breakup of cooperation between the regime-changing opposition groups indicated their gradual coming into conflict with each other. Then their conflicts were further sharpened by the process of the formation of parties in the years 1989-90 and the logically increasing political competition due to the upcoming general elections. The articles written in connection with the media war or the disputes aroused by the writings of Sándor Csoóri and István Csurka belonged to the first episodes of the clash between the populist and urbanist camps after the regime change. In Hungarian

political thinking about the Jewish question, these disputes were significant even from two points of view. They functioned in one way for the participants and in another way for the ones following disputes on the forums of political publicity. In the first case their role was important as long as they served the function of identification for the participants of the disputes. Their role was to set the boundaries between opposing intellectual camps: *"the ones identifying themselves as Jews"* and *"the ones considering themselves to be the members of the non-Jewish cultural heritage"*.[22] Primarily due to these writings, after the disputes, in the thinking of Hungarian society, the distinction between Jews and non-Jews living in Hungary became a criterion again. There must have been people – among the members of the generation born in the Kádár regime in the first place – who learnt the patterns of the anti-minority worldview offering cheap and clear-to-all explanations for social problems at that time.

The public thinking of the time and specialist literature in some places tended to treat the differences between the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ, AFD) and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF), the winner of the elections, which could be linked to the populist line, as the conflict of urbanists open to Western-type modernization and populists traditionally representing the third-road solution, that is, the clash of a *"Hungarian party"* and a *"Jewish party"*. This over-simplifying formula suggested that the relationship which took shape between the government and the opposition after 1990 could be connected to the Jewish question. This approach did not stand up from multiple points of view. Apart from the fact that none of the parties' elite of the time or the voters affiliated with them can be treated as a homogeneous bloc, this approach took no notice of the fact that József Antall, the prime minister candidate of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF) and later the head of the first freely elected government, did not think in populist ideological terms, but he was a politician enquiring on the intellectual horizon of modern Christian Democracy. This trend could owe its historical successes to the very fact that it formulated a sharp theoretical opposition against anti-Semitism in the years of World War II. The mainstream of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF) pushed forward and supported by Antall represented this mentality. However, it did not automatically mean that all the politicians of

[22] Kovács, András. "A demokrácia vadhajtásai." In his study András Kovács gives the following example for this discourse relating to identification. "The articles mainly appearing in right-wing newspapers aimed at clarifying Hungary's participation in World War II and levelling the cruelties of communists to the prosecution of the Jews. Survivors of the Holocaust were hurt by the identification of communist cruelties with the prosecution of the Jews. However, those who also had pains rooted in the war and had had to keep quiet about them for decades could have been hurt by the Holocaust being presented as an eternal and exlusive story." Retrieved. 28 Nov. 2011. from: http://www.antiszemitizmus.hu/a+demokracia+vadhajtasai+iv.html

the party together with their intellectual entourage unanimously took Antall's position on the Jewish question.

In this respect, the divide of the ex-governing party is well-known, which was indicated by the reception of Csurka's study most succinctly. It was not accidental that the *"vice president's"* [23]1992 writing caused a nationwide stir and created a crisis within the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF) at the same time. The writing titled "A néhány gondolat a rendszerváltás két esztendeje és az MDF új programja kapcsán" ["A Few Thoughts in Conjunction With the Two Years Since the System Change and With the New MDF Program"] containing hardly hidden anti-Semitic remarks provoked a sharp protest both from certain circles of the governing party and the opposition.[24] According to József Debreceni belonging to the national liberal group of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF), Csurka's treatise, apart from its anti-Semitism, threateningly resembled the National Socialist ideology as well – as he put it – *"it contained a complete foundation of Nazi ideology"*.[25] On the contrary, the National Board of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF) stated that although there are debatable formulations in the writing, but after all *"it serves as an emotional and moral reinforcement of our will to act"*.[26] The Prime Minister himself got into a delicate situation as well, since he knew that *"the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF) membership respected him, the one who joined the party recently while they liked Csurka who had been a true-born MDF member"*. Antall's political adversary as the chief editor of *Magyar Fórum* played a more and more authoritative role in the circles of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF). His pamphlet gained considerable backing within the party, that is why, for tactical reasons, Antall – against his political conviction and the damages caused to the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF) – had to postpone the final showdown with him for almost a year. The fight between Csurka's radical nationalism and Antall's moderate centre-right finally ended in the more marked separation of the two trends, the organization of Hungarian Road Circles (Magyar Út Körök) and Csurka and his followers' expulsion from the party. All who represented overt anti-Semitism had to leave the governing party. The Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) formed in 1993 lacked only just over 85,000 votes to get into Parliament in the next elections. Although the party reached

[23] He was only one of the 5 vice presidents of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF). The papers wrote that he was the second most important person of the governing party.

[24] József Debreceni's letter to István Csurka. *Népszabadság*. 27. Aug. 1992.

[25] Cf. Debreceni, József. *A miniszterelnök*. [*The Prime Minister*.] Osiris Kiadó, 1998. 314.

[26] Quoted by Debreceni: ibid. 318. In the 1990 Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF), Csurka is rather an emblematic figure, "who is listened to but his advice is not followed" than an influential personality. Later, he gains political weight by becoming the chief editor of *Magyar Fórum*, the party newspaper. By 1992 he became the truthful prophet and the idol of a section of the membership of the party.

the 5 percent vote threshold necessary to get into Parliament in 1998, but the number of its supporters kept decreasing in the following elections, its electoral base gradually fell apart while finally, the 1280 votes gained in the 2010 elections indicated that it had sunk into total insignificance.

According to András Kovács, the most pernicious role Csurka played in the changes of Hungarian anti-Semitism was mainly that the publicist made a kind of anti-Semitic argumentation presentable in public discourse after its having been squeezed out for 50 years. Besides, he violated even the taboo born around the regime change that responsible politicians do not make such statements.[27] However, we also have to see that Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) led by Csurka and having been expelled from the governing party was not really able to build a mass base for itself by sending anti-Semitic messages. It remained a vulnerable party controlled by one man and supported by intellectuals living in cities all way long. Its ideology was part of the elite discourse typical of the populist-urbanist debate, which had not found its way to the masses. According to a MEDIÁN survey conducted in October 1992 when the scandal broke out, only 24% of the respondents mentioned Csurka's name among the important internal affairs and 38% of them could not even tell what he caused the stir with. 63% of those who were familiar with the issue did not agree with the politician's views from the outset.[28] Csurka's political communication strategies (his long political essays, pieces of publications, speeches) were only decodable for a narrow stratum of society. Essentially, the party proved to be unable to create such a version of the romantic and emotionally charged texts understandable already only to intellectuals which would have been suitable for mass consumption. All along, its support was based in the capital, mainly rather in the elite districts and in the towns of country rank, where it was highest.[29] Moreover, Csurka was not a responsible politician either, but rather a ranting agitator of the opposition, a *"saloon-bar politician"* who resorted to any means.[30] His "*exquisite verbalism"* feeding on

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[27] Kovács, András. "A demokrácia vadhajtásai."
http://www.antiszemitizmus.hu/a+demokracia+vadhajtasai+ii+2.html

[28] Kovács, András. "A demokrácia vadhajtásai." Ibid. Retrieved 9 Dec. 2011. from:
http://www.antiszemitizmus.hu/a+demokracia+vadhajtasai+ii+2.html

[29] Gimes, Gergely. Juhász Attila, Kiss Kálmán, and Krekó Péter. "*Látlelet.2009*." A research summary about the causes of the strengthening of the Hungarian extreme right. Commissioned by the Hungarian Anti-Racism Foundation [Magyar Antirasszista Alapítvány.] Political Capital, 2009.82.

[30] "What he did was saloon-bar politics." It was exactly what Antall was already afraid of and he warned of in the autumn of '89. In vain. "However, neither in a saloon bar, nor in politics can anybody make a bigger mistake than become stronger when being weak." Debreczeni: ibid. 340. It was Antall, who used the phrase saloon-bar politics in order to describe "Csurkism" as opposed to realpolitik, which takes into account the circumstances of the feasibility of political goals. The politics of temper and violence incite and flatter. It is the politics of catchwords which does not care about facts. Cf. G. Fodor, Gábor. Fűrész Gábor, and Giró-Szász András.

Hungarian opposition traditions had never transformed into a realpolitik programme. According to some analysts, the temporary success of the party was due to the fact that centre-right politics were not recognizable enough, that is the reason why people who did not actually support right-wing radicalism could get affiliated with the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP).[31] Later Orbán's political catchwords could separate them from Csurka's party. According to the 1995 sample taken by MEDIÁN, the Jews together with the ethnic Germans were the two most accepted minorities living in Hungary.[32] The examinations made by Zoltán Fábián and Endre Sík showed even back in 1996 that in Hungary, the Gipsies were the most rejected social group while the opinion about Jewry, which can be based on the responses reflecting feelings of social distance, proved to be relatively favourable. Discriminatory behaviour against the Jews met with powerful cultural obstacles.[33] According to some pieces of research conducted by Gallup, in 1993-94, on responding to the questions of a questionnaire, 14-15% of the adult population openly said that they did not like the Jews. Subsequently, overt anti-Semitism became a less and less accepted behaviour in Hungary. In the 2003 sample, only 6-7% of the respondents chose from the possible answers on the questionnaire that they did not like the Jews.[34] To study the relations regarding ethnic and political attitudes, samples were taken in 1994 and 2002.[35] When measuring political anti-Semitism, researchers took it as their starting point that the too big political and economic influence attributed to Jewry lies in the centre of anti-Semitic political thinking, it is believed to be the root of social problems. They attempted to measure this aspect of prejudiced thinking with the help of stereotypes taken from public discourse which seem to be suitable for rationalizing anti-Semitic feelings. 34% of the respondents agreed with the statement that

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"Kocsmapolitika. "["Saloon-bar Politics."] Retrieved. 5 Dec. 2011. from: http://www.szazadveg.hu/files/kutatas/2.pdf

[31] Tőkéczki, László. "A Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártjának Jövője." *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2002-ről.* ["The Future of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party." *Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2002*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2003.

[32] Social Development Institute http://www.socialdevelopmentinstitute.eu/?page_id=286 The favourability index scoring 57 in 1995 fell as low as 44 by 2009 while the scores of the most rejected Gipsy population scoring about 25 in 1995 – after a slight increase between 2002 and 2006 – stagnated around 24 in 2009.

[33] Fábián, Zoltán, and Sík Endre. "Előítéletesség és tekintélyelvűség." ["Prejudice and authoritarianism."] In.*Társadalmi Ripot 1996*. [*Social Report 1996*] and TÁRKI Database. http://www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/a895.pdf 388..

[34] Between 1993 and 2003, overt anti-Semitism was forced back significantly. While in 1993-94, 14-15% of the adult population's response was that "they do not like the Jews", the ratio of those giving the same response was only 6-7% in the years 2002 and 2003. By 2007, the number of people rejecting the Jews had risen to 13% again. Cf. Gallup Institute. http://www.gallup.hu/Gallup/release/eloitelet030919.htm

[35] Fábián, Zoltán. "Etnika és politikai attitűdök vizsgálata." ["Examination of Ethnicity and Political Attitudes."] and Enyedi, Zsolt, Fábián Zoltán, and Sík Endre. "Nőttek-e az előítéletek Magyarországon?" ["Have prejudices increased in Hungary?"] In.*Társadalmi Riport 2004*. [Social Report 2004.] 375-399. and TÁRKI Database. Retrieved. 6 Dec. 2011. from: http://www.otka.hu/index.php?akt_menu=3496

"Jewish intellectuals control the press" while 21% considered *"Liberal parties represent primarily Jewish interests"* to be right. As for the Holocaust, only 11% of the respondents accepted the statement that *"There were fewer Jewish victims than it is usually claimed"*, but according to nearly three fifths, 57% of the respondents, *"non-Jewish Hungarians suffered just as much as Jews did"* during World War II. In 2002, 23% of the respondents considered the statement referring to the ancient anti-Semitic topos of Jewish conspiracy, *"There exists a secret Jewish network determining political and economic affairs."* to be true. In Hungary, the ratio of those openly express their prejudices against Jews had dropped to less than the half in the course of 10 years between 1992-2002. In this period, the rate of anti-Semitism did not rise in all certainty. Not even if we take into account the group of the so-called latent anti-Semites, which is difficult for researchers to measure.[36] András Kovács, based on his examinations conducted between 1993 and 2003, came to the conclusion that approximately 10% of the adult population was extreme anti-Semites and another 25% of the population harboured different kinds of anti-Semitic prejudices. There was nothing like *"the frightening renaissance of anti-Semitism"* over that period, there was essentially no significant difference between the data of Hungary and those of other European countries.[37]

Anti-Semitic Hysteria Versus Anti-Hungarian Hysteria

The 2002 general elections created a somewhat new situation in terms of Hungarian public dispute over anti-Semitism as the Jewish question, from Csurka's abstract ideological discussion of principle, got into the very concrete context of political struggles of parties and much rather became the part of everyday political tactics than it had been earlier. That is why the post-2002 history of political thinking in connection with the Jewish question cannot be understood without a brief survey of the relations of party politics.

Fidesz – after being in government and forced into opposition – aimed at integrating right-wing voters in order to maximize votes necessary to replace the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, HSP)-Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ, AFD) coalition in the long run. The *"one camp, one flag*" strategy declared in 2002 served to gain the sympathy of radical voters situated to the right from the bourgeois centre-right. It postulated that liberal conservativism

[36] Kovács, András. "Antiszemita előítéletek Magyarországon. A disszertáció tézisei." ["Anti-Semitic Prejudices in Hungary."] http://www.mtaki.hu/docs/all_in_one/061020_kovacs_andras_tezisek.pdf 9.o.

[37] Kovács, András. "Antiszemita előítéletek a mai Magyarországon. A disszertáció tézisei." ["Anti-Semitic Prejudices in Contemporary Hungary "] http://www.mtaki.hu/docs/all_in_one/061020_kovacs_andras_tezisek.pdf 14.o.

should be more open to the right. This strategic idea justified itself with overthrowing the left-wing government and legitimized itself by preventing the extreme right from strengthening as an independent party. As later events showed, this political conception had only limited success. It did not make the change of government possible, but weakening the extreme right can be considered to be partially successful as the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)-Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) obtaining only 2,2% of the votes in the 2006 elections had to remain in the shadow of Fidesz. As a result of the failure, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) disappeared from the public and Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) formed in 2003 approached to the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz-MPP), but striving to keep its organizational independence all along. Contrary to Orbán's idea, Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s strategy was the *"one camp, more flags"* thought. As it is well-known, from 2007 on, the success of this strategy seemed to be more and more probable.[38]

However, Fidesz's vote maximization strategy as an objective commanded a high price. The differences between the values of centre-right conservatism and those of the radical right were not only inconsistent with each other in the long run but also laid themselves open to the left. In the communication of Fidesz – first only in the events organized after 2002 by the civic circles – ideological and symbolic messages, more radical wording appealing to extreme right groups appeared, while in the end, according to authoritative scientific analyses, after the defeat in 2006, the party itself became radicalised spectacularly.[39] In order to keep the camp together – as part of the strategy for gaining votes – it was inevitable that the elements of radical right rhetoric would appear in centre-right political communication. For the same tactical reason, more radical politicians within the party, whose viewpoint did not necessarily agree with the official position, received a more emphatic public role.[40] All these provided an opportunity for the left-wing governing parties to raise the questions of anti-Semitism and fascism in connection with the aspirations of Fidesz and to call upon the biggest party of the opposition to disassociate itself from extreme manifestations more markedly. The Alliance of

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[38] "I find it beneficial from the society's point of view. This prevents Hungary from resembling those countries where either from the right or from the left, radical powers appear, whom only God knows till when can be kept in the under-20% pillory, that is, within the frameworks of the European democratic tradition. The good deed of people's party politics is that radicals also accept the rules of the game of parliamentarism." said Orbán to one of the papers in 2006. Juhász, Attila, and Somogyi Zoltán. "A magyar szélsőjobb újratervezési kísérlete 2006-ban." *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2006-ról*. ["An Attempt to Reorganize the Hungarian Extreme Right in 2006." *Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2006*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2007.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Héjj, Dávid, and Cshutz Gábor. "A jelenkori jobboldali radikalizmus dilemmái." ["The Dilemmas of Today's Radical Right."] *Századvég Műhelytanulmányok*. 4. [*Századvég Studies*. 4.] Retrieved. 24. Nov. 2011. from: http://www.szazadveg.hu/files/kutatas/A-jelenkori-jobboldali-radikalizmus-dilemmai.pdf 9.

Free Democrats (SZDSZ, AFD) blamed its right-wing rival for unjustified tolerance towards anti-Semitic views, and with quite an exaggeration, for *"hidden fascist inclinations"*. [41] According to Mária Schmidt's article published in *Magyar Nemzet* in March 2006, these steps taken by the left with the intention to stigmatize were the *"attacking reflexes of the left well-known from history"* serving the same purpose as the categories of the class enemy or the imperialist agent in the 1950s. *"They hammer the villainy, fascist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, discriminatory, that is, dishonest nature of those expressing a different opinion into people's heads until they state that their opponent is not worthy of being accepted as a debater. Pretending to feel sorry, they declare that you do not have to and are not supposed to talk to the right,"*[42] reckoned the author. In its communication strategies, the left endeavoured to blur the line between centre-right powers and *"the right with the Árpád stripes"*.[43] They did this so vehemently that their attacks on Fidesz were labelled as *"political hysteria caused by the left"* by some of the political analysts themselves.[44] According to a piece of writing by Péter Hack in December 2006, for example, Fidesz not only *"welcomes"* the extreme right, the believers of *"National Socialism being reorganized"* and those of *"anti-Semitic radicalism"*, but is also ready to undertake both the symbols and the theoretical foundation of the Arrow Cross system.[45] According to some analyses, for example in Tamás Fritz's opinion, in this political situation, in the relationship between Fidesz and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ, AFD), the populist-urbanist divide haunting since the regime change was reproduced. However, the position held by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF, HDF) having weakened in the meantime was taken over by Fidesz having strengthened on the national side. *"Philo-Semitic Free Democrats often label Fidesz as anti-Semitic, but the mildest statement they make is that Fidesz does not disassociate itself from the anti-Semitic demonstrators in the street, from the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda), the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) frequently and unambiguously enough"*. In the political scientist's opinion, that is the way how the left wants to make the public believe that if Fidesz takes over the government, it will have disastrous consequences

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[41] Fritz, Tamás. "A politikai megosztottság és a törésvonalak kérdése Magyarországon." *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2005-ről*. ["The Question of Political Divide and Fault Lines in Hungary." *Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2005*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2006.

[42] Schmidt, Mária. "Értékek felforrósodott küzdelme." ["Heated Struggles of Values."] *Magyar Nemzet* 4 Mar. 2006. *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2006-ról*. [*Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2006*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2007.

[43] Lengyel, László. "Kétezer-hat." *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2006-ról*. [*Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2006*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2007.

[44] Héjj, Dávid, and Cshutz Gábor. "A jelenkori jobboldali radikalizmus dilemmái." ["The Dilemmas of Today's Radical Right.] Századvég, 2006.

[45] Hack, Péter. "Kiútkeresés." ["Looking for a Way Out."] *Hetek* 15. Dec. 2006.

for minorities and democracy.[46] The anti-racist and anti-fascist campaigns of the left were labelled by the right as either *"an act of compensation"* or the tool for diverting the public's attention from corruption affairs and governmental mistakes. These campaigns were considered as such political tools that before long became an integrated part of the Gyurcsányist methodology. They were used to restore the disrupted unity of leftist powers by pointing out that the common enemy is fraught with deadly danger to democracy.[47] The events of home affairs provided ample pretexts to fight the ideological battles worsened by the Jewish question.

In the interpretations of the crisis taking shape after the Öszöd speech, the simplified reading projected onto the ethnic fault line was implied again. According to the right-radical situation evaluation, the essence of the crisis is the conflict between the nation and those standing against it, that is, foreigners (Jews). According to this, The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, HSP)-Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ, AFD) coalition was revealed in connection with Öszöd. It came to light that they represented the interests of aristocracy of money while crippling the Hungarian nation to extremes. However, according to the governing party's version, the crisis was caused by Orbán's political irresponsibility, who, having been defeated in the elections, roused the tempers and by doing so, he paved the way for the extreme right anti-Semitic revolt of the mob.[48] In the latter evaluation of the situation, which was simplified into a good or bad dichotomy as well, a responsible reformist constitutional left faced Fidesz demagogues conspiring with irresponsible fascists.[49] Here we should note that the several-hundred-page-long report drawn up by the experts of the Gönczöl Commission set up at the Gyurcsány government's initiative to investigate the 2006 events refers to the phenomenon of anti-Semitism 3 times altogether, not considering anti-Semitic sentiments determinative in the outbreak and development of the crisis. According to the Civil Lawyer Committee – well-known for Krisztina Morvai – preparing the right-wing interpretation of the events having taken place on 23 October 2006, not only was there no anti-Semitism but just the other way round, Hungarians were pursued *"... Not the shocking signs of anti-Semitic hysteria but those*

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[46] Fritz, Tamás. "A baloldali félelmek felerősödése és azok okai." *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2008-ról*. ["The Strengthening of Leftist Fears and its Causes." *Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2008*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2008.

[47] Stumpf, István. "Kormány a reformkényszer és a bizalomvesztés hálójában. Öszöd és a tüntetések árnyékában. A gyurcsányizmus elhúzódó agóniája." *Magyarország Politikai Évkönyve 2007-ről.* [*Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2007*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2008.

[48] "Vizsgálati jelentés a 2006. szeptember–októberi fővárosi demonstrációkkal, utcai rendzavarásokkal és rendfenntartó intézkedésekkel kapcsolatos eseményekről." "Report on Demonstrations, Street Riots and Police Measures in September-October 2006." Retrieved. 22. Dec. 2011 from: http://www.gonczolbizottsag.gov.hu/jelentes/gonczolbizottsag_jelentes.pdf

[49] Dénes, Iván Zoltán. "Válságértelmezések" ["Interpretations of crisis."] *Élet és Irodalom*, 21. Dec. 2007.

of anti-Hungarian hysteria took form" because peaceful people wishing to exercise their right of assembly were insulted in large numbers and called anti-Semites and fascists.[50] In the first week of March 2007, in the Hungarian Parliament, Ferenc Gyurcsány expressing his opinion on the increasing use of the flag with Árpád stripes said that such number of signs of anti-Semitism in Hungary had not been experienced since World War II. Then during an interview he gave to a British paper, he spoke of anti-Semitism *"growing to an unprecedented degree"* and blamed Fidesz for not disassociating itself from those waving the Árpád-striped flag and those people in Kossuth Square who demand that Jewish public figures be hanged.[51] Extremely differing opinions on the extent of anti-Semitism divided the Jewish community itself too. At the beginning of March, connecting to the left-wing evaluation of the situation MAZSIHISZ (The Federation of Jewish Communities) suggested their members that they should not go out in the street on the coming national holiday *"due to the intensity of anti-Semitism in Hungary not having been experienced for a long time"*. In a few days, an open letter titled *"We are Jews and not frightened"* signed by nearly fifty Jewish intellectuals rejected the exaggerations in connection with the degree of anti-Semitism. According to the authors of the statement, although the spread of street violence, which is also accompanied with manifestations of anti-Semitism more than once, worries sensible Jews, but we would still be mistaken to think that the whole Jewish community might be in danger in the situation having taken shape.[52]

Extremely differing opinions on the evaluation of the situation were typical of the statements made after the formation of the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda). Fidesz's vice president put down the formation of the organization to the consequence of Ferenc Gyurcsány's behaviour while according to the official position of the left-wing government, *"the behaviour of some members of Fidesz parliamentary group or that of people who can be indirectly linked to it harbour the formation and existence of the Hungarian Guard"*. [53]

Thus, when the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) was formed in 2007, left-wing politicians – starting to scare with extremes again – talked about the danger of the revival of fascism and the spread of neo-Nazis, which otherwise regarding their political goals seemed to be a logical solution promising political profit. Anti-Nazi and anti-racist campaigns were meant to

[50] "Morvai jelentés. A 2006 október 23-i budapesti erőszakos cselekmények kivizsgálására létrejött civil jogász bizottság jelentése." "Morvai Report. The report of the Civil Lawyer Committee set up to investigate the atrocities having taken place on 23 October 2006." *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2006-ról.* [*Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2006*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2007.

[51] A Ferenc Gyurcsány interview in *the Times*. *Sófár*. Retrieved. 12 Jan. 2012. from: http://regi.sofar.hu/node/80649?tid=111

[52] MTI – 13 Mar. 2007. bhttp://index.hu/politika/belhirek/304053

[53] HVG.hu 26 Aug. 2007.

represent the degree of danger and make the left-wing seem to be the only power which can stand in the way of the expansion of the extreme right. Besides, the events – as we emphasized earlier – could be used to blur the line communicatively between the right-wing using the Árpád Stripes and the liberal-conservative centre-right and treat the whole opposing camp as a homogeneous bloc, stigmatize it as fascist and discredit it. Since then the events have shown not only the line between Fidesz and Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) but also the political weight of the Guard. Although the organization/self-organization of the Hungarian Guard could not be suppressed (after its disbanding in 2009, almost immediately it reorganized itself), but the current number of its members[54] does not justify the social risk and the fascist threat overplayed and drummed into the public's head. Surveys done at that time showed that the Guard was rather moderately supported by the society otherwise. According to the results of the opinion poll conducted by MEDIÁN in 2007, the formation of the Guard aroused fear in 21% of the entire Hungarian population, while 38% considered such kind of paramilitary formations dangerous in general. On the contrary, not more that 13% of the respondents found it sympathetic and 23% chose the answer according to which, the Guard was an unserious phenomenon that only the media had blown up.[55] It was only 4% of the entire population that both regarded the Guard as a militant organization and supported it at the same time.[56] Naturally, several kinds of conclusions can be drawn from the facts of empirical research. According to Mária Vásárhelyi's interpretation of the same data in 2007, half of the Hungarian society do not see dangers in the Hungarian Guard and similar formations.[57]

More numerous or only louder?

Hungarian radical-right movements were not able to create a considerable camp of followers in the two decades of the post-system-change period. Smaller organizations representing extreme anti-Semitism (Magyar Ellenállási Front led by Albert Szabó Or the Blood and

[54] According to the database of the Athena Institute, which does research on radical, so-called hate groups, the presumed number of the members of the Hungarian Guard is 700, that of the Hereditary Hungarian Guard is 40 and that of the Hungarian National Guard is 100. http://athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/

[55] The survey also showed that the percentage of those in whom the organization aroused great fear (39%) and those who found these kinds of formations dangerous in general (43%) was significantly higher among left-wing voters. Cf. *HVG* 35 (2007), 1 Sept. 2007.

[56] "Ki mint fél úgy ítél." A MEDIÁN analysis. http://www.median.hu/object.9eeed0a8-efc2-4286-81ea-4fe22cc801af.ivy

[57] Vásárhelyi, Mária."Miért hagyták hogy így legyen?" *Sófár*. Sept. 2007. Retrieved. 24 Nov. 2011. from: http://sofar.sofargo.hu/node/94377

Honour, that is a Hungarist Movement founded by György Ekrem Kemál in 1994) could only occasionally and temporarily get themselves in the public eye. Csurka and the political thinking of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) reached efficiently only a thinner layer of the intellectuals and a group of voters, which was essentially insufficient to get into parliament. In connection with the internal affairs of 2006 and 2007, the opportunity for radical organizations to break out of the marginal role was created. Their activity increased, radicalism in the streets appeared, their role played in political publicity became more emphatic.

The number of the members of the neo-Nazi, racist and anti-Semitic groups, now called hate groups – due to their highly conspirative nature – can only be estimated. It is characteristic of them to signal their presence by different organized actions (placing a wreath on the grave of Eszter Solymosi at Tiszaeszlár, damaging Holocaust memorials, slanderous graffiti, Holocaust denial). Verbal and physical aggression against the community is typical of their using political tools, that is why from a social risk's point of view, they involve grave danger. Anti-Semitism and anti-Romaism are equally characteristic of the ideology of these organizations, their manifestations are only partially identical, though. While in the case of anti-Semitism, incitement against community, the display of banned emblems of autocracy, damage and vandalism are common, in the case of anti-Romaism, physical aggression occurs much more frequently, having already resulted in death more than once. According to the Hate Crime Record Database of Athena Institute, crimes involving physical aggression have primarily been committed against Roma people. The report made by Athena Institute in 2010 emphasizes the strengthening of hate groups as a result of the crisis. However, taking it into account as well, there are only 17 such organizations motivated by racism known in Hungary. These days, three groups are considered to be determinative: A Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (the Hungarian National Frontline), Pax Hungária (Pax Hungarica) and the Blood and Honour Hungary organizations.[58]

Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) with the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) behind appeared to be much more suitable to revive populist anti-Semitic discourse. As a group

[58] Cf. http://athenaintezet.hu/index/ The Hate Crime Record Database of Athena Institute keeps a record of 10 hate crimes committed between 2009 and March 2010 whose presumed motive was anti-Semitism. 2 out of these belong to the category of aggression against community, but nobody was injured in either of them, though. 14 anti-Roma hate crimes were recorded in the same period. 7 out of them belonged to the category of aggression against community, 4 people were killed and 7 people got injured. The risk classification of hate groups is based on the criteria system of the FBI. Generally, neo-Nazi, racist and anti-Semitic groups belong to the levels 4 or 5 from social risk's point of view. The Death Squad, which can be connected to murdering Roma people in several cases, is an exception. It was classified to have threat level 7. Cf. http://athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletbuncselekmeny_lista/?q=roma Retrieved. 12 Jan. 2012.

defining itself as nationalist and radical, it differs from earlier bearers of racism from several aspects. 1. In contrast to the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) is not a lower middle-class protest movement. In its mass base, young people, pensioners and the region of north-east Hungary is overrepresented. 2. As opposed to Csurka, the media *Barikád* and *Kurucz.info* are undoubtedly suitable to create a populist racist public discourse and even to inspire the formation of a radical political subculture. 3. In the politics of radical nationalists, the mainstream of inciting hatred is directed not towards Jews but towards Roma people. They build on anti-Romaism, which is more markedly present in Hungarian society than anti-Semitism. Since the "authenticity" of their ideological message cannot really be supported with the everyday experience of the Hungarian population towards Jews, but all the more so towards Roma people, applying the latter promises more political profit.[59]

Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) made use of the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda), officially registered as an association to preserve Hungarian culture, to build the party.[60] It can be demonstrated that until the appearance of the Guard, party building almost stagnated. However, from August 2007, the number of newly formed local organizations of the party had risen spectacularly. The party capitalised on its increased potential for political mobilization in the 2009 EP (European Parliament) elections, and then in the general elections in 2010 and got into Hungarian Parliament. While it received 427,773 votes in the EP elections in 2009, the number of votes gained in the general elections in 2010 was already 855,436. This share of the votes is three times more than the best election results of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)[61] and it also means that the party doubled the number of votes received between the two elections, that is, in a year. Although the party has several fault lines threatening its unity and success in the future, in 2010, it could push them in the background efficiently and unified its potential electoral base at the right moment.[62]

Anti-minority rabble rousing is an integral part of Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s extremist political rhetoric. In its image of society, the Hungarian nation is a value to be protected against being imperilled *"from above"* by the Jews and *"from below"* by the Roma. In this enemy image, besides the Roma most often mentioned as scapegoats, the Jews – being

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[59] Gimes, Gergely, Juhász Attila, Kiss Kálmán, and Krekó Péter. *Látlelet 2009*. Political Capital, 2009. 82.
[60] Ibid. 69.
[61] Krekó, Péter. "Összeesküvés elméletek a hazai szélsőjobboldal ideológiában." ["Conspiracy theories in the ideology of the Hungarian extreme right."] *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 2010-ről.* [*Political Yearbook of Hungary on 2010*.] Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2011.
[62] "A Jobbik kilenc törésvonala." (An analysis.) Nézőpont Intézet, http://nezopontintezet.hu/tag/jobbik/page/2/ and http://piroslapok.blog.hu/2010/03/09/kikbol_all_a_jobbik

put in the context of globalization – are cast in the role of collaborators in an international conspiracy against Hungary. In accordance with the classic anti-Semitic argumentation, the colonizing policy of Jewish capitalists was supported by liberalism and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ, AFD), its institutional embodiment (until it dropped out of party politics), as well as the left-wing government at their mercy.[63] *Barikád* and *Kurucz.info* affiliated with Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) created an overtly anti-Semitic and anti-Roma ideological talking community, which through the open-ended radical right digital network having been more successfully developed than that of the other parties spreads efficiently in the virtual equivalent world of Hungarian society. The Hungarian Guard having brought real success in mobilization for Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) rather builds its communication strategies and political actions on anti-Romaism. However, its activity – so to say as an additional element – may reinforce anti-Semitic discourse as well.[64] Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s antiglobalization ideology is in inherent harmony with the classic anti-Semitic pattern of "international Jewish capitalists", which is, however, only an additional element for the mass base for the time being. It is just possible that the international economic crisis may as well enhance the significance of the theme of anti-Semitism too. The history of the party so far shows that its real political breakthrough has been brought about by anti-Romaism.

In considering our subject, the fundamental question is whether as a result of the role played by Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) in internal affairs, anti-Semitism has strengthened or has only become louder and whether the more than 800,000 voters who supported the party in the last elections can be regarded as fascist or not. From the rise of the previously unprecedented media representation of the radical right, many drew conclusions in that direction that the representatives of fascist ideas had taken heart and the number of racists and discriminators had increased in Hungarian society. [65] In 2007, Mária Vásárhelyi made the diagnosis that racism and anti-Semitism had pushed forward. András Kovács, however, in an interview given to *Index* in March 2007, on summarizing the results of his empirical data

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[63] Gimes, Gergely, Juhász Attila, Kiss Kálmán, and Krekó Péter. *Látlelet 2009*. Political Capital, 2009. 58..

[64] Gimes, Gergely, Juhász Attila, Kiss Kálmán, Krekó Péter, and Somogyi Zoltán. *Látlelet 2008*. "Kutatási összefoglaló az előítélet, intolerancia hazai helyzetéről." ["A research summary on the situation of prejudices and intolerance in Hungary."] Commissioned by the Hungarian Antiracist Foundation (Magyar Antirasszista Alapítvány). 20.
http://www.maraalapitvany.hu/upload/eloiteletesseg_tanulmany_081016.pdf

[65] Vásárhelyi, Mária. "Miért hagyták, hogy így legyen?" *Élet és irodalom* 2007. 21 Sept. http://www.es.hu/vasarhelyi_maria;miert_hagytak_hogy_igy_legyen; retrieved. 23.07.2007 html

collection in 2006, adopted the standpoint that there were not more anti-Semites in Hungary, the rate of radical anti-Semites, those who would discriminate against the Jews had been unchanged at around 10% for years. In comparison with the earlier conditions, he saw the change in the representatives of extreme anti-Semitism voicing their opinions more strongly and in the more frequent occurrence of anti-Semitic manifestations in a political context. At the same time, he drew attention to the fact that besides extreme anti-Semites having taken heart in the communication climate becoming more favourable to extremist ideas, 15-20% of the respondents harboured prejudice against Jews. Nevertheless, prejudiced thinking in itself does not mean that these people would automatically support a policy aiming at the "Final Solution".[66]

In the 2010 research into new authoritarianism conducted by György Csepeli and et. al.[67], respondents were asked to judge whether Jews rather did harm to Hungarians or rather helped them in the past. A quarter of those filling in the questionnaire showed indifference to the question, the share of respondents not answering the question was 21% while 6% of the sample showed intense anti-Semitism. According to this group, Jews only had an adverse effect on the fate of the country. According to 64% of the respondents, the Holocaust does not belong to the three biggest national disasters of the country. The researchers attempted to measure extreme political anti-Semitism by studying the relation to Arrow Cross stereotypes. They examined to what extent respondents agree with the extremist demand for *"Hungary free of Jews"*, or with the statement that Jews themselves are also responsible for what happened to them during World War II. 70% of the sample representing the entire adult Hungarian population gave a negative answer to both questions reflecting an extremist attitude, 18% of the respondents accepted one of the statements while the share of those who agreed with both statements was 3%. The research concept classifies the category with one extreme anti-Semitic response as *"rather extreme political anti-Semitism"* while ranks the people agreeing with both responses as the believer of *"extreme political anti-Semitism"*. One of the novelties of this research was that apart from the national representative sample, two subsamples were also included in the examination. The questionnaire was asked both among the members of an organization openly identifying with the ideology of radical nationalism and those of a civil environmental organization. The members of both organizations live in

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[66] "Nincs több zsidógyűlölő, de hangosabbak." An interview András Kovács gave to *Index*. Tbg – 4 Mar. 2007. http://index.hu/politika/belfold/0303ntszmt2/

[67] ELTE Társadalmi Konfliktuskutató Központ, Új tekintélyelvűség projekt és a Debreceni Egyetem Szociológia és Szociálpolitika Tanszéke. (Institute for Social Conflict Research ELTE, New Authoritarianism Project and the Departments of Sociology and Social Psychology of the University in Debrecen.)

the north-east region of Hungary, where Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) had outstanding election results. Comparative data show that in terms of the responses related to anti-Semitism, there was no significant difference between the civil environmental subsample and the national representative sample. However, in the radical group, the number of those holding rich Jews responsible in connection with the tragedy of the persecution of the Jews during World War II was significantly higher and the number of those marking the responsibility of Horthy and the gendarmerie as an answer was lower compared to the national average. Nobody in this group chose the response referring to the responsibility of the Hungarian population for the events. Only 28% of the radical nationalist subgroup rejected the responses discussed above reflecting extreme anti-Semitism while – as we saw in the national sample – the share of those who disagreed with the Arrow Cross patterns was 70%. 15% of the radical nationalist group can be classified as *"extreme anti-Semite"* as they agreed with both the programme of Hungary free of Jews and the statement that Jews themselves are responsible for what happened to them. Based on the data, 26% of radical nationalists were put into the category of *„rather extreme anti-Semite"*.[68]

The latest results are provided by the data collected in November 2011. For years, András Kovács has been researching into the topic using nearly similar methodology, that is why his research results based on using questionnaires can serve as a basis for comparison. This time, they indicated the significant growth of the camp of extreme anti-Semites. According to some pieces of research conducted after the turn of the millennium (depending on the methodology applied), 10-15% of the adult population was categorised as extreme anti-Semite and András Kovács himself had measured 8-12% earlier. The growth trend started in 2009, it reached its 22% peak in 2010, in the year of the general elections, then fell to 20% by November 2011. The reason for the sudden increase, presumably, is that while latent anti-Semites when being asked earlier, not finding their answers presentable, either did not answer questions examining anti-Semitism or concealed their views by giving responses thought to be socially acceptable. After 2009, however, in the political communication climate created by Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), they took courage and voiced anti-Semitic sentiments in public. All this can be also made likely because the rate of those refusing to answer was decreasing at the same time.[69] According to the survey done by MEDIÁN in 2008, for Hungarians, after the

[68] Csepeli, György, Murányi István, and Prazsák Gergő. *Új tekintélyelvűség a mai Magyarországon. Társadalmi csoportok hierarchiájának látásviszonyai*. [*New Authoritarianism in Contemporary Hungary*.] Aperion Kiadó, 2011. 128-130.

[69] "Az antiszemita nyelv legitimmé vált a közbeszédben." ["Anti-Semitic Speech Has Become Legitimate in Public Discourse."] An interview with András Kovács. *Szombat.* 4 Jan. 2012.

German minority, Jews are the most accepted ethnic group while the Roma are the most rejected. The sympathy index of Jewry has also turned in the negative direction since then and by 2009 it had dropped from 50 point to 44.[70] Between 1993 and 2006, only 10-14% of the population found Jews antipathetic. However, in 2011, this rate had already grown to 24%. The German ethnic minority is considered to be the only minority Hungarians find sympathetic and still Jewry is the second most accepted group, that is, the least antipathetic.

The interpretation of the data can be helped by comparing them with similar foreign values or such research results which measured the attitudes of the Hungarian population to other minorities. For example, in Germany, the respondents who can be regarded extreme anti-Semites was 18% in 2003 while the sympathy index of Jews fluctuated strongly. There, the highest rate of those rejecting Jews was 33% in 1991, but in 2008, it was only around 15%.[71] According to the unanimous results of several surveys, the sympathy thermometer, measuring the Hungarian population's sympathy for minorities, shows that Hungarians have strong xenophobic tendencies not only towards Jews but *"strangers"* in general. It is known that in terms of intolerance towards minorities, Hungary stood pre-eminent from the outset though in this respect, the situation in the post-communist countries with weaker democratic tradition in the region is similar too.[72] If we compare the data about the relationship with the Jews with the data aimed at measuring the opinion towards the Roma, we can see that there is an order of magnitude difference between the social acceptances of the two minorities. The social base of anti-Semitism is nearly a quarter of that of anti-Romaism. While according to the supposition made by researchers in anti-Semitism, its broadest base might range from about 20-25%, 81% of Hungarian society can be said to be anti-Roma in a respect, which is based on 2009 data. The analysis of the political map of the Progressive Institute (Progresszív Intézet) also shows that people with anti-Roma attitudes do not exclusively come from the ranks of the right wing. The rate of respondents declaring themselves leftists and rightists was almost equal. Thus, a rejecting attitude towards the Roma minority exists in contemporary Hungarian society regardless of political affiliation.[73] According to the earlier shown research conducted on a national sample by György Csepeli and et. al., 34% of the Hungarian

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[70] Gimes, Gergely, Juhász Attila, Kiss Kálmán, and Krekó Péter. *Látlelet 2009*. Political Capital ibid. 25.

[71] "Az antiszemita nyelv legitimmé vált a közbeszédben." ["Anti-Semitic Speech Has Become Legitimate in Public Discourse."] An interview with András Kovács. *Szombat.* 4 Jan. 2012.

[72] Enyedi, Zsolt. "Érték, értelem, érzelem. Politikai pszichológia Bibó nyomán." ["Value, Sense and Emotion. Political Psychology on the basis of Bibó."] *Politikatudományi Szemle* XIII/4 (2004.) 5-18. Retrieved from: http://www.poltudszemle.hu/szamok/2004_4szam/2004_4_enyedi.pdf

[73] "Cigányellenesség a Magyar társadalomban." ["Anti-Romaism in Hungarian Society."] http://www.publicus.hu/blog/ciganyellenesseg/Megtekintés: Retrieved. 09.10.2011

population think that the Roma rather definitely did harm to Hungarians in the past while 63% chose the answer that they only did not help. The results refer to the *"Roma-phobia"* of the majority of the Hungarian population. More than half of the population, 53% of the respondents declare that *"Roma people often threaten peaceful people"*.[74] Much rather anti-Roma public discourse has become an accepted norm in wider social circles and the phenomenon of the spiral of silence affects those who would make positive statements about the Roma. On the contrary, those social groups where anti-Semitic statements are considered to be presentable are significantly smaller. Political parties (also including the official rhetoric of Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)) spectacularly disassociate themselves from anti-Semitism and playing by the unwritten rules of political competition labelling each other as anti-Semites in order to stigmatize the other party.

Without doubt, the economic crisis found Hungarian society in a bad socio-psychological condition from the outset. It is proven by results of the European comparative research into values and those of the related Hungarian empirical research.[75] Not only strangers and minorities do Hungarians not trust but nor do they each other. The amount of social capital in Hungary is very small in European comparison.[76] The indicators of bad social mood not to be neglected such as the lack of trust in the operationality of the political establishment, political anti-elitism, the tendential fall in the popularity of political leaders and scepticism of the European Union. Hungarians are chronically pessimistic and tend to think in conspiracy theories.[77] As a result of the crisis, growing existential anxiety, the fact of becoming déclassé or the fear of becoming déclassé in itself are breeding grounds for radical world explanations and for an inclination towards radical solutions in our country as well as anywhere else in the world.[78] All these are background factors which can make people susceptible to extreme right ideologies, creating the demand for radical politics. In 2010, the already mentioned Political Capital published the research results which are based on the comparative analysis of 32

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[74] Csepeli, György, Murányi István, and Prazsák Gergő. *Új tekintélyelvűség a mai Magyarországon*. *Társadalmi csoportok hierarchiájának látásviszonyai*. [*New Authoritarianism in Contemporary Hungary*.] Aperion Kiadó, 2011. 109-126.

[75] Gimes, Gergely, Juhász Attila, Kiss Kálmán, and Krekó Péter. *Látlelet 2009*. Political Capital,

[76] The rate of those who do not think that people can be trusted and reckon that one cannot be careful enough with the others is 79%. Cf. Gimes, Gergely, Juhász Attila, Kiss Kálmán, and Krekó Péter. *Látlelet 2009*. Political Capital, 21.

[77] Cf: ibid. 9-29.

[78] Tóth, András, (MTA PTI) and Grajczjár, István. (Zsigmond Király Főiskola) "Miért olyan sikeresek a radikális nemzeti populista pártok válságok idején?" ["Why are populist radical nationalist parties so successful in periods of crises?"] *Politikatudományi Szemle*. 3 (2009) http://www.poltudszemle.hu/szamok/2009_3szam/tothandras-2009-3.pdf Retrieved. 08.10.2011.

countries. The so-called DEREX Index (Demand for Right–Wing Extremism)[79] developed by the researchers of the institution serves the function of establishing the degree of the social demand for right-wing extremism. Certain elements of the measuring tool changed considerably in the negative direction between 2002 and 2009. While the rate of right-wing orientation did not change significantly in society, sub-index values indicating anti-establishment sentiments grew quite considerably from 12,4% to 45,5%. Within the category, exactly the critical attitudes towards democracy had strengthened to an alarming degree. Fear, distrust and pessimism had definitely risen in society, from 19,1% to 27,4%. The extent of prejudice and welfare chauvinism changed from 3,3% to 52,4%. As the joint effects of all these, Hungary's DEREX score worsened from 9,9% in 2002 to 20,7%. [80] According to the developers of the index, this means that there is danger that some figures of the political system (it may as well be 20-30%) take a radical direction. With the 20,7% result, Hungary is considered to be one of the most endangered countries out of the 33 countries examined. (In Scandinavian countries, where DEREX Index scores were the lowest, 1-2% of the population was susceptible to extreme right ideologies.) Between 2002 and 2009, demand for the extreme right proved to be stronger in villages all along, but a strong shift to the right could be experienced in cities too. DEREX Index scores were the lowest among young people, but prejudices in this age group in the examined period had also increased to one and a half times more while anti-establishment sentiments had quadrupled. In regional breakdown, the north-east region's scores are the highest.[81]

Thus, who are Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s supporters? Can we call these people showing undoubtedly greater intolerance towards minorities compared to the national average fascists? Analyses done after the European Parliament elections emphasized the aspects of age, geography and type of settlement in terms of the electoral base. Public-opinion polls showed the overrepresentation of young people while analyses explained the significant role these aspects played by insufficient democratic political socialization, people feeling existentially threatened, susceptibility to symbolic politics, distrust in traditional community-building institutions.[82] The time having elapsed since then has shown that communities based

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[79] *HVG*. 11. 02. 2010. and "Back by Popoular Demand" http://www.riskandforecast.com/post/in-depth-analysis/back-by-popular demand_411.htmlhttp://hvg.hu/itthon/20100210_derex_political_capital_szelsojobboldal Megtekintés: 09.10.2011.

[80] Krekó, Péter, Juhász Attila, and Molnár Csaba. "A szélsőjobboldal iránti társadalmi kereslet növekedése Magyarországon." ["The Increase in Social Demand for the Extreme Right in Hungary."] *Politikatudományi Szemle*. 2 (2011). Table 1. 64.

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[82] *Látlelet. 2009*. 77-81.

on new authoritarianism have a strong attraction for this group, all the more so because Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s political communication features based on digital community building in the community media correspond to this group's communication habits. Századvég – based on their 2010 surveys – classified one fifth of the 18-29 age group and 21% of the 30-39 age group as Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s sympathizers. Among the members of the group, we can find young graduates without a vision for the future and young first-time voters inexperienced in politics. According to the analysis, *"the experience of being front-line soldiers turns their heads (Ernst Jünger), the opportunity that they take part in the enterprise, they can stand there at the very beginning"*. [83]

The second overrepresented group of the party's voters is that of people living in the country, which is a considerable change compared to the (rather elite-district-of-the-capital) base of ex-MIÉP. Finally, examining the regional aspect, it stands out clearly that support is the strongest in the north-east region of Hungary, which is usually explained by the existential hopelessness reigning there and the high rate of the Roma population. The rate of Jewry in this region is practically insignificant. Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s social base cannot be regarded as a homogeneous bloc. In all probability, there are fascists and extreme anti-Semites among them, but they comprise only a fraction of the bloc exceeding 800,000 voters. Supporters of the radical right are mostly defenceless people who suffer from an existential identity crisis, live in deep poverty, are disillusioned with post-system-change politics, afraid of tomorrow and when trying to find an explanation for their bad social feelings, they tend to think in conspiracy theories and look for a scapegoat. In this respect, Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)'s camp is united much rather by anti-Romaism than anti-Semitism.

Nevertheless, anti-Semitism has been present in post-system-change political thinking all the time due to the joint effects of several factors. However, in its continuance, very different social and political buoyancies played the main role in different periods. In the beginning, intellectual fixations inherited from the past, and then in the second period much rather party political interests artificially pumped it up while in the era last discussed, the main motivating factor of anti-Semitism is grounded by tendentially deepening bad social mood. Anti-

[83] G. Fodor, Gábor, Fűrész Gábor, and Gíró Szász, András. "Kocsmapolitika. A jobbik, mint probléma."["Saloon-bar Politics. Jobbik as a Problem. "] Századvég Alapítvány,.[Századvég Foundation.] http://www.szazadveg.hu/files/hirek/rqmcu4nyz6-2.pdf 6. Retrieved. 24. 11.2011.

Semitism of today is not about the Hungarian Jewish community, but it is about the crisis of the whole society, which affects each group living in it regardless of their ethnicity.

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