Page 62 - The Voyage of Hungarian Christian Democracy - Edited by Mária Rita Kiss

the sub-cultural base of faithful voters. Political analyses in the era suggest that the KDNP
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did not manage to win over potential voters from its crisis-torn coalition partners, the MDF
and the FKgP – i.e. parties with an above-average chunk of faithful voters among their
supporters. One important factor behind this was that the leftist media made “Christian” and
“Christian reigning” synonyms of right-wing politics, thereby returning to the stigmatization
practices of the communist era. Labelling the KDNP as a “church party” was intended to prove
the “reactionary” character of the right-wing government. This ideological label was designed
to suggest that the governing coalition strove to restore the long-outdated and undesirable
historic times of the Horthy era. This hit especially the KDNP at a sensitive point as the party
defined itself a secular, democratic party standing on the foundation of Christian values. At a
study weekend organized by the Vilmos Apor Adult Education Centre and the István
Barankovics Foundation in August 1993, László Surján devoted his whole presentation to this
issue. Titled “The Christian Way of Making Hungary Successful”, the transcribed version of the
lecture was also published in the September issue of Hírlevél. After introducing the worldview
basics of Christian participation in public life, Surján criticized the leftist mindset that
envisaged “Christian reigning” when talking about the Antall government. “In 1990, moral
crisis was mentioned often … it was also stated that religion may and should have a decisive role
in resolving the situation. It is a major disappointment that some perceive all steps into that

direction as signs of the churches’ hunger for power. They mention “Christian reigning”
disparagingly, while nobody can explain what they actually mean by that term and why anyone
should be fearful of it” – he said. The examples of identity accusations from the left also
indicate that identity destruction efforts were a far cry from facts and historical justice. Thus it
was not the Horthy era that the KDNP’s politics of memory reached back to, but Hungarian
historical tradition after World War II. In the eye of the historic greats referenced by the
KDNP, Sándor Giesswein and István Barankovics, the “Christian” policy of Horthy era was
false Christian at best. As contemporaries, they rejected it and their policy was aimed at
creating an alternative thereto. The KDNP, as this chapter also intended to confirm, used
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the adjective “Christian” to express their worldview as opposed to a sign of connectedness to
the church. The KDNP rejected the accusations pertaining to its identity and although they
clearly communicated that the accusations were absurd, this was not effective enough to
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break down the negative stereotypes about the party.

In the spring of 1993, the leadership of the Christian Democratic People’s Party
decided about the campaign strategy for the parliamentary elections scheduled for the
following year. The proposals about the would-be strategy pointed towards two opposite
directions. Those who argued for highlighting the party’s worldview said that the KDNP
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must present itself in the campaign as a dedicated representative of the Christian thought, the

292 Cf. István Schlett: Stabilizálódás, vagy elbizonytalanodás [Stabilization or Hesitation]. MPÉ. op. cit. 1993.
293 Cf. Gergely. op. cit. p. 126.
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To illustrate the functioning of stigmatization, Isépy brought up his own example in one of his speeches in parliament. He recalled that in 1944, he was
labelled as a liberal plutocrat from Budapest; Upon his forced relocation in 1952, he was already labelled as a fascist. “If ‘Christian reigning’ is identical to the
personalist worldview represented by the KDNP, then we should accept this label, as it’d put us in line with European tradition” he continued. Quoted by: Szűcs
op. cit. p. 121.
295 Four drafts were prepared in March 1993. Although the party image alternatives were not yet outlined in a crystal clear form, the essence of each core
concept appeared in the drafts. The executive board adopted the paper of István Eszes as it represented the image of a European party in the clearest form. Cf.
Tenders of applicants to the election campaign manager position. Party documents. Executive board documents. 1993.

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